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Background: Quality and safety improvement initiatives in healthcare often display two disconcerting effects. The
first is a failure to outperform the secular trend. The second is the decline effect, where an initially promising
intervention appears not to deliver equally successful results when attempts are made to replicate it in new
settings. Matching Michigan, a patient safety program aimed at decreasing central line infections in over 200
intensive care units (ICUs) in England, may be an example of both. We aimed to explain why these apparent effects
may have occurred.
Methods: We conducted interviews with 98 staff and non-participant observation on 19 ICUs; 17 of these units
were participating in Matching Michigan. We undertook further telephone interviews with 29 staff who attended
program training events and we analyzed relevant documents.
Results: One Matching Michigan unit transformed its practices and culture in response to the program; five boosted
existing efforts, and 11 made little change. Matching Michigan’s impact may have been limited by features of program
design and execution; it was not an exact replica of the original project. Outer and inner contexts strongly modified
the program’s effects. The outer context included previous efforts to tackle central line infections superimposed on
national infection control policies that were perceived by some as top-down and punitive. This undermined
engagement in the program and made it difficult to persuade participants that the program was necessary. Individual
ICUs’ histories and local context were also highly consequential: their past experience of quality improvement, the
extent to which they were able to develop high quality data collection and feedback systems, and the success of local
leaders in developing consensus and coalition all influenced the program’s impact on local practices.
Conclusions: Improved implementation of procedural good practice may occur through many different routes, of
which program participation is only one. The ‘phenotype’ of compliance may therefore arise through different
‘genotypes.’ When designing and delivering interventions to improve quality and safety, risks of decline effects and
difficulties in demonstrating added value over the secular trend might be averted by improved understanding of
program mechanisms and contexts of implementation.
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Health systems worldwide face the frustration of a mass
of evidence repeatedly showing problems in the quality
and safety of patient care, but much less compelling
evidence on how such problems can be tackled effectively
[1-3]. The Michigan Keystone project [4] is one important
exception. It was widely welcomed as a demonstration
that improvement in patient safety could be secured* Correspondence: md11@le.ac.uk
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distribution, and reproduction in any mediumthrough a large-scale interventional program, following its
report of a dramatic reduction in rates of central venous
catheter (central line) bloodstream infections (CVC-BSIs)
in over 100 Michigan intensive care units (ICUs) [4]. The
cohort study design used in evaluating the Keystone
project could not establish a causal relationship between
the program and the outcomes, but later research using
controlled designs suggested that the effects were probably
real. One retrospective analysis reported decreased in-
hospital mortality in 95 of the Keystone hospitals compared
with 364 control hospitals in the surrounding region [5],entral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
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different in Keystone. A cluster randomised trial in a
new non-Keystone setting found that hospitals using
the program outperformed the secular trend towards
decreasing infection rates [6].
Keystone’s success is sometimes attributed simply to the
introduction of a checklist summarizing five evidence-
based practices linked to infection control for CVCs [7]:
 Appropriate hand hygiene
 Use chlorhexidine for skin preparation
 Use full-barrier precautions during central venous
catheter insertion
 Subclavian vein placement as the preferred site
 Review and remove unnecessary CVCs
Other analyses propose that a more complex set of
mechanisms is more likely to explain the results, however
[8]. These accounts recognize that the evidence-based
practices are essential to any effort to reduce infection.
They further recognize that checklists of these practices
may have a potentially very useful role—not least by
providing cognitive prompts or reminders of good practice.
But a long history of failed or partial implementation makes
it clear that evidence-based procedures and guidelines
rarely directly impact on practice without facilitating
mechanisms [9].
Based on a synthesis of the original program specifica-
tion, the Keystone program team's experience, and social
scientific expertise, a post hoc theorization proposed six
mechanisms that might explain the effects seen in Keystone:
generating isomorphic pressures (the desire to conform
to group norms) among participants; creating a densely
networked community, with strong links between units,
encouraged by regular meetings and communication,
that reinforced these norms and enabled sharing of
information; taking on many of the characteristics of a
social movement and reframing CVC-BSIs as a social
problem capable of being solved through grassroots
activism; using multiple interventions that functioned in
different ways to shape of culture of commitment to doing
better; harnessing data on infection rates, collected
systematically, as a disciplinary force; and deploying
mainly soft tactics, such as persuasion, but also making
some limited use of harder tactics such as threatening
sanctions against laggards [10].
Some have questioned whether the success of Keystone
could be replicated under different circumstances [11].
An important opportunity to address this question was
presented by Matching Michigan (Figure 1), a program
led by the UK’s National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA)
following the announcement in the National Health
Service (NHS) Next Stage Review [12] of a ‘dedicated
national patient safety initiative to tackle central linecatheter-related bloodstream infections, drawing lessons
from [the] remarkably successful Michigan initiative on
the same topic’ (p45). Matching Michigan recruited
more than 200 ICUs in England in four staged clusters. It
ran between April 2009 and March 2011, with the results
published in 2012 [13].
One interpretation of Matching Michigan is that it
‘worked’: it reported a final rate of 1.48 CVC-BSIs per
1,000 CVC patient days across 215 adult ICUs, thus
‘matching’ the rate of 1.4 seen by the end of the Keystone
project [13]. However, the study design used to evaluate
Matching Michigan—a modified form of a stepped wedge
study involving clusters of ICUs that joined in staged
sequence—permitted a more complex story to emerge, by
detecting a strong secular trend towards decreasing rates
of CVC-BSIs. Clusters of ICUs that were waiting to join
the program were reducing their CVC-BSIs at the same
rate as those already in the program, and infections
acquired outside ICUs (in settings not targeted by the
program) were reducing at the same rate as infections
acquired inside ICUs (which were the target). This meant
that the improvements seen in Matching Michigan could
not confidently be attributed solely to program participation
[13]. Thus, an alternative interpretation is that Matching
Michigan did not work, in the sense that its additional
impact on change that was occurring anyway was not clear.
The results ofMatching Michigan illustrate two recurring
themes in the literature on quality and safety in healthcare.
First, many improvement programs fail to exceed the
overall ‘rising tide’ [14-17], and thus have difficulty in
proving that they have added value. Yet what has happened
in non-intervention settings to secure improvement usually
remains obscure in such programs, even though it is
unlikely that the improvement is without cause. Second,
Matching Michigan is a possible example of the so-called
‘decline effect’ associated with the challenges of replicating
what appear to be initially promising results in scientific
fields [18]. Neither secular trends nor decline effects have
been well explored in the literature on quality and safety in
healthcare. In this paper, using data from an ethnographic
study conducted concurrently with the program, we seek
to explain Matching Michigan’s apparently disappointing
additional impact.
Methods
We conducted an ethnographic study involving observa-
tions, interviews, and documentary analysis. Sites were
purposively selected for participation in the study by
sampling from the population of adult ICUs in England
based on location, size, participation/non-participation
in Matching Michigan, and types of patients served
(speciality/general). ICUs joined the program in a series
of four staged clusters (a design that allowed the secular
trend to be detected). ICUs were sampled from each of
Figure 1 Matching Michigan.
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from the fourth. Research Ethics Committee approval for
the study and research governance approval at each site
was obtained.
Fieldwork involved non-participant observations on
the ICUs. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with
nurses and doctors of varying grades. These interviews
were semi-structured, guided by a prompt list that had
been developed through review of the literature, pilot
work, and discussions in the project team. The prompt
list was modified, albeit modestly, over the course of the
project to explore some issues in more detail as their
relevance became evident. The prompt list was not used
rigidly and not all questions were asked of all participants,
nor were they asked in the same order. This enabled
flexibility and responsiveness to the particular interests,
experiences, and roles of different participants. Further
telephone interviews were conducted by JW (see acknowl-
edgements) with staff, including managers and clinicians,
who had attended Matching Michigan training events but
were not part of the ethnographic study. Signed consent
was obtained to interviews, which were recorded using a
digital recorder, transcribed, and anonymized. In addition,
we attended all training events and analyzed relevant
documents relating to the program.
Analysis was based on the constant comparative method
[19]. We initially generated open codes based on tran-
scripts and fieldwork notes, which were then grouped into
higher order organizing themes. Analysis was recursive,
constantly moving from the specific to the more general,
with the aim of producing more generalizable categories
and explanations for our findings. This enabled us to
identify commonalities and patterns across the large
number of settings in which we conducted our study.We actively sought disconfirming cases to enable us to
check our emerging constructs. The transcribed field
notes and interviews were coded by ML using NVivo
software, with checks on coding and interpretation
undertaken by CT and MDW.
Results
We conducted ethnographic visits to 17 of the 196
adult ICUs in England that participated in Matching
Michigan. Most (96%) of ICUs in England took part in
the program, but we were able to secure access to two
non-participating units. Thus, 19 ICUs were included
in the study in total. We conducted around 910 hours
of observations and 98 semi-structured across the 19
ICUs. Our analysis is focused primarily, though not
exclusively, on the 17 units that participated in the
program. We carried out 29 telephone interviews with
training event participants.
We found that Matching Michigan was challenged both
in showing that it was outperforming the secular trend
and in defending against the decline effect for reasons
relating to the design and execution of the program, the
national context into which it was introduced, the impact
of individual ICUs’ histories, and local approaches to
measurement and engagement. We found little evidence
that Matching Michigan functioned in the way the
post-hoc theory hypothesised that the original Keystone
project had worked [10].
Design and execution of the program
Matching Michigan was not an exact replica of Keystone
across a range of dimensions (Table 1).
Some differences between the two programs were
superficially minor; others were more far-reaching. The
Table 1 Selected differences and similarities between the Keystone project and Matching Michigan
Keystone Matching Michigan
1. One cohort 1. Four cohorts (97% of English ICUs), including one pilot
2. Kicked off with 6 weeks of ‘immersion’ weekly teleconferences 2. Kicked off with data collection training
3/Whole-state workshops every six months—1.5 or 2 days
(overnight), gradually becoming participant-led
3. Each cohort attended two ‘training events’ (0.5 or 1 day)—data collection
and intervention
4. Continuous contact via teleconferences with 100~200 4. Teleconferences only at the beginning; discontinued after poor attendance.
Webinars continued, but generally not well attended.
5. 5/6 months getting started with data collection & implementing
the comprehensive unit-based safety program and daily goals;
then Ventilator Acquired Pneumonia (VAP) and CVC-BSI
interventions.
5. Initial period (3-6months according to cohort) of data collection
only, then all interventions in any order. No VAP intervention.
6. Interactive web-based data entry tool allowing comparison
with others
6. Interactive web-based data entry tool allowing comparison with others
7. Program team asked for infection rates to be reported by
infection control practitioners independent of the ICUs.
7. ICUs allowed to determine method of data collection and reporting
for themselves. Detailed definitions and guidance provided.
8. Targeted adult ICUs primarily 8. Targeted both adult and paediatric ICUs
9. Led by collaboration between prestigious out of state
university and the state hospital association
9. Led by government agency
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of five evidence-based practices through a combination of
technical interventions (e.g., a checklist summarizing the
five practices and a dedicated line insertion trolley/cart)
and ‘adaptive’ interventions (e.g., the Comprehensive Unit-
based Safety Program, or CUSP, intended to help in altering
culture and behavior). Matching Michigan, in an example
of a minor difference, used the term ‘non-technical’ to
describe the interventions known as ‘adaptive’ in Keystone.
These non-technical interventions were not labelled as
the CUSP (the term used in Keystone), but their content
was largely the same as the original.
The content of the technical interventions used in
Matching Michigan was largely similar to Keystone. What
was much more different was the provenance and freshness
of these technical interventions for the target audience.
Where Keystone had introduced a set of five evidence-
based procedures summarized into a checklist that was
new to participating units, Matching Michigan’s procedures
were based on two pre-existing Department of Health
CVC ‘bundles’ of procedures known as ‘High Impact
Interventions.’ The two bundles (one for insertion and
one for ongoing care) had already been established policy
since 2007, two years before the program launched. Thus,
apart from an updating of the insertion bundle to recom-
mend that hats and masks be worn during CVC insertion,
the evidence-based procedures were not new in England
at the launch of the program, and they were closely associ-
ated with established central government policy. English
ICUs had already had significant exposure to the evidence
on procedural good practice for insertion and care of
catheters by the time the program launched; the bundles
had been heavily promoted by the Department of Health
and by other agencies over a significant period.The organization of Keystone and Matching Michigan
differed significantly, though in ways that might not be
evident from a quick examination of the program com-
ponents. Both programs held meetings for staff from
participating ICUs. However, in contrast to Keystone’s
model of initial immersion coaching and six-monthly
residential workshops, with all participating units meeting
at the same time, Matching Michigan offered two non-
residential training events for each of the four clusters as
they entered the program. The first training event for each
cluster covered data definitions and data collection and
the second the program’s interventions. These training
events were described by participants as professionally
organized and effective in stimulating interest. Participants
saw the opportunity to hear from peers as especially useful
both for leadership and for practical learning about how
to improve practice:
‘I thought it was really well organized and quite
inspirational really, you know, there’s a big culture thing
to consider when you’re making quality improvements,
and that is, if another consultant [attending physician]
has done it, and is signed up to it, that has huge
impact.’ (Senior nurse, participant 25)
The training events did, however, encounter some
challenges. Some ICUs sent large, eager teams to the
training events; others sent one or two individuals, who
had sometimes been unwillingly volunteered. Participants
understood that they were being asked to collect data and
ensure the CVC care bundles were fully implemented, but
some appeared to have difficulty in understanding what
they were required to do for the non-technical elements
of the program. The sessions were inclined to become
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anxieties about the effort required to collect the data:
‘[The first training session] featured a lot of sniping
between consultant microbiologists about how the
[program] actually defines associated and [related]
CVC-BSIs.’ (Infection control nurse, participant 11)
Participants from different ICUs did not meet again
after the training sessions, and efforts to engage them in
teleconferences and webinars suffered from low participa-
tion rates. This meant that the ICUs involved in Matching
Michigan did not have the experience of being part of a
collaborative community working together towards shared
goals theorized to have occurred in Keystone.
National context
At Matching Michigan training events, lack of clarity
about how well or how consistently the recommended
practices were being implemented was presented as a
rationale for the program. It was suggested to participants
that the program would, through its interventions, promote
adherence to the procedures specified in the Department
of Health bundles and have a more general impact on
patient safety. Matching Michigan was promoted by the
organizers as a clinically led, cooperative program, and
participants were assured that their infection data would
be used only for learning. However, the national context
into which Matching Michigan was introduced meant
that the program faced some scepticism. In contrast
to Keystone, a centrally-led emphasis on infection
control had been a feature of the English NHS since
the mid-2000s (Table 2).
These government-led efforts were widely seen by staff
as harsh and coercive. Matching Michigan was perceivedTable 2 History of infection control efforts relevant to centra
2001 Mandatory reporting to the Health Protection Agency (HPA) of M
2003 Report of the Chief Medical Officer: Winning ways: guidance to r
2004 Mandatory reporting of Clostridium difficile infection (HPA websit
Surveillance of Nosocomial Infections in ICUs protocol. http://hel
2005 DoH Saving Lives program—NHS High Impact Interventions (NH
2006 Health Act 2006: Department of Health Code of Practice gives ne
by the Health & Social Care Act 2008
2008 2008 Health and Social Care Act 2008: required registration with
New code of practice.
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/P
2008 Patient Safety First sponsored by National Patient Safety Agency
CVC-BSIs http://www.patientsafetyfirst.nhs.uk/content.aspx?path
2009 Some NHS trusts participated in CQUIN (Commissioning for Qua
dependent on demonstrating compliance
2011 Mandatory reporting of MRSA and Escherichia coli bacteraemia.by some as just the latest in a long parade of similar
top-down initiatives:
‘There’s a huge amount about [the infection control
agenda] that’s dogmatic … with the consequences of
not hitting the targets being so dire [and] unforgiving
central policies … And I think a lot of it has been
driven like that.’ (Consultant, participant 20)
Those who saw Matching Michigan simply as another
externally mandated program had little inclination towards
genuine engagement. A multi-disciplinary team was ap-
pointed to lead the program, including a senior ICU
physician who had previously been president of the
European Society of Intensive Care Medicine (JB, one
of the authors of this article), and a senior clinical
intensive care nurse who had been head of the UK
Critical Care Nurses’ Association. Despite this, the
location of the program in a government agency rather
than a professional organization or research collabor-
ation appeared to contribute to an alienating sense of
‘distance’ on the part of some front-line clinicians:
contrary to what was theorized to have occurred in
Keystone, Matching Michigan was often seen as imposed
from outside and lacking in professional ownership. Some
participants remained suspicious about the potential for
the data to be used for performance management or public
shaming purposes:
‘Because the NPSA is a Department of Health arm’s
length body, there is certainly a view by a lot of
clinical staff that oh, if it’s coming down from there
then, you know what that is all about. So I think there
is certainly a limitation attached to that.’
(Senior Nurse, participant 104)l venous catheters
RSA bacteraemia.
educe healthcare associated infection in England.
e) 2004 Hospital in Europe Link for Infection Control through
ics.univ-lyon1.fr/helicshome.htm
S-HII), modelled on Institute for Healthcare Improvement bundles.
w powers of inspection to the Healthcare Commission. Superseded
the Care Quality Commission: duty to protect patients against HCAIs.
ublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_081927
(NPSA), NHS HII, and Health Foundation, includes interventions to reduce
lity and Innovation) schemes that made a percentage of their incomes
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like what we are implementing is coming from within,
first of all…If we had taken what Matching Michigan
had done, not called it Matching Michigan but taken
the same things and then applied it as something that
came through for example the Intensive Care Society
or [another professional society]… it was dumped on
top of us from above and we had no option in it.’
(Consultant, participant 3)Variability in ICUs’ responses to the program
We found considerable variability across individual ICUs
in their responses to Matching Michigan’s calls for data
and implementation of the technical and non-technical in-
terventions it recommended. Interviews and ethnographic
observations suggested that local, unit-level responses to
the program could be largely distinguished not by the
degree of compliance with the program’s requirements,
but by the extent to which staff in units attributed their
behavior and practices toMatching Michigan. We identified
three characteristic responses:
1 Transformed (one unit) where the program was
seen by staff as having produced radical
improvement in care.
2 Boosted (five units), where the program was credited
with having reinforced existing good practice or
supported further improvements.
3 Low Impact (11 units), where staff attributed little of
their behavior and practices to the program, instead
seeing the influences on what they did as coming
from elsewhere.
We did not find a relationship between which cluster
ICUs joined and their response to the program, but our
study design does not fully exclude this as a possibility.
Despite the variability we observed, most staff from
across the ICUs believed that both their practices and
their responses to the program were ‘normal’ and typical
of all. This is likely to have occurred because of limited
contact between program participants.Collecting data on infections
All 17 ICUs in the ethnographic study that were partici-
pating in Matching Michigan developed systems for
collecting data on CVC bloodstream infection rates, and
all but one reported their rates to the program’s central
database for at least some months of the program. On 16
of the participating units, staff attributed the introduction
of a data collection system to Matching Michigan; the
exception was a unit that had begun collecting and feeding
back data as part of their involvement in an earlier initia-
tive. For the 11 Low Impact units, establishing the datacollection system was the most prominent, or only, feature
of their response to the program.
Technical interventions
Because our study was not an audit, and we did not use a
structured tool to assess practices, we did not produce
precise estimates of compliance with Matching Michigan’s
technical standards. Nonetheless, our observations suggested
that the evidence-based practices summarized in the CVC
care bundles, and the technical interventions to support
them, were being implemented across all of the units in
our study. On all units where we conducted observations
(including the two not participating in Matching Michigan),
the care bundles were known to staff and were widely used.
Hygiene practices during insertions were mainly very good:
chlorhexidine was routinely used to prepare patients’ skin,
and handwashing was consistently good. Most ICUs were
using a dedicated central line cart and/or a pack; most, too,
were using full barrier drapes. Most were aware of the need
to monitor CVCs and to remove them as soon as possible,
though there was evidence that removal practices varied by
individual physician. However, use of a checklist of good
practice was variable: only eight of the 17 participating
ICUs recognized that a checklist was intended to be used
concurrently with CVC insertion (rather than as post hoc
audit tools), and only two were fully consistent in using a
checklist in this way.
It was usually not possible to identify Matching Michigan
as directly influencing technical practices and behaviors;
indeed, on any given unit it was difficult to isolate the
effects on practices of any single program, initiative or
intervention. Instead, most participants gave accounts
of an incremental history of improving technical practice.
The main exception to this was the Transformed ICU.
This unit demonstrated a high level of consistency in
compliance with the technical interventions, and staff in
this unit explicitly and confidently attributed recent
improvements to their participation in Matching Michigan.
The five Boosted ICUs also demonstrated high (though
not always perfect) reliability in applying the technical
interventions. They credited the program with helping
them sustain or enhance improvements already made, but
did not identify it as the only influence on their behavior
in relation to CVC care. In the 11 Low-Impact ICUs and
in the two non-participating units, staff did not identify
the program as having any influence on their behaviors
and practices. In some of these units, compliance was
generally high, but was less consistently good on others,
and in some units appeared to be strongly influenced by
which senior staff were on duty:
[Consultant] said, ‘we just have to be vigilant about
thinking about how long the lines have been in.… He is
careful to check patients’ [central lines]. It wasn’t
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I didn’t see that they were very explicitly vigilant
about how long the central lines were in,’ (Fieldnotes)
Innovations such as bio-patches, specially coated
catheters, and new techniques for aseptic practice were
introduced by many units during the period of our
observations. On the whole, staff did not attribute these
new developments to Matching Michigan, although staff
on some of the Boosted and Transformed units described
using the program strategically to implement the changes.
Telephone interviews suggested similar behaviors:
‘What I am doing is focusing on our own needs though
the project. Matching Michigan was merely a hook
because it enabled us to do all the things that we
wanted to do.’ (Senior nurse, participant 119)
Non-technical interventions
Participants’ understanding of Matching Michigan’s non-
technical interventions (Figure 1), intended to change
culture and behavior, was generally weak. ICUs were, as
they had been in Keystone, asked to assemble a local
Matching Michigan safety team including nurses, doctors,
and senior executives to provide leadership and coordin-
ation for the program. On the Transformed and Boosted
ICUs, the safety team generally functioned well. On the
remaining ICUs, it existed in name only or did not function
optimally. In one ICU, it only ever met by email; in many
others, its main function was the production of infection
data. The safety teams varied in the commitment and en-
thusiasm they invested in the program. They were often
unsure of what the non-technical interventions required
them to do, were sceptical of the benefits of the interven-
tions, or did not ensure that the interventions were
implemented. Most (11) struggled to involve executives.
Safety Surveys—one of the non-technical interventions
intended to provoke local discussion and reflection—were
distributed in only three of the 17 ICUs. In very few ICUs
was there evidence that ‘learning from one defect a
month’ was introduced as a result of Matching Michigan,
nor was formalised or standardised practice in relation to
daily goal-setting newly implemented. Only three ICUs
publicly displayed CVC-BSI data so that staff were aware
of their own unit’s rate. Strongly hierarchical and sometimes
negative safety cultures persisted on some ICUs:
‘Working with different consultants is that I would say
probably without exception as registrars [residents] we
do what the consultant tells us to do, certainly where
they’ve got very strong personalities, so I’ve put central
lines in with just a pair of gloves with the individual
who does it like that …because that’s how he does it,
he won't let you do any other way and as registrarsyou're under pressure to do things as the consultant
wants you to do them …[or] you know makes the rest
of your day miserable.’ (Junior doctor, participant 30)Influences on variability in responses to the program
Our analysis suggested that much of the units’ variability
in response to Matching Michigan could be explained
by variability in infection rates and measurement, local
histories, and local leadership.Infection rates and measurement
Program organizers emphasized at training events that
the impact of previous efforts to control CVC-BSIs was
unknown, given the absence of a national infection data
collection system. They also emphasized that unless ICUs
knew their own rates they could not be sure that they
were providing safe care. It was anticipated that discovery
of high rates of infection would stimulate change:
‘What we did not have in this country was a measure
of the outcome.... Key stakeholders in the country [were
saying to us], ‘well we are fine in England, we are
already matching Michigan. We have had the
technical interventions. We have got it all sorted in
England. So go away.’ And I actually did say to them,
‘Well, could you tell me what your rates of infection
are?’ And they said ‘Oh I don’t know.”
(Matching Michigan program team member)
The starting rate for the program turned out to be quite
different from Keystone, where the initial mean rate was
7.7 BSIs per 1000 catheter days. The first of the four
clusters of adult ICUs in Matching Michigan reported
an initial mean rate of 3.7 BSI per 1000 catheter days.
Though this was less than half the initial rate in Keystone,
it did suggest room for improvement. However, each of
the three successive clusters joined the program on the
trend line, with an initial infection rate similar to the post-
intervention level of the preceding cluster. This indicated
that substantial improvement occurred outside the program
throughout the period it was running. In any given
month, almost two-thirds of units across the program
were reporting no infections.
In the Transformed and the Boosted ICUs, collecting
infection rate data had a generally positive impact on
practice. These units established relatively robust data
collection systems [20] and the data were generally
accepted by staff locally as credible. Discovery of a low
infection rate did not necessarily undermine the program’s
aims; low rates on these units were used to celebrate and
reinforce good practice. Discovering previously unrecognized
high rates of CVC-BSIs, on the other hand, did have the
intended program effect of driving change on these units:
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we were that bad.… We thought, you know, [we] don’t
really have a problem with central line infections. But
I think what it was, nobody ever looked to see whether
we were any good … and when we compared our
infection rates, actually they were far worse than any
of us ever realized.’ (Senior nurse, participant 43)
‘It was hard to sit and have the error of your ways
pointed out when you actually already knew [how
things ought to be done]. So, I think enough of us felt
like that we put the wheels in motion really.’
(Consultant, participant 42)
However, Matching Michigan data on infection rates
could have effects that were in the opposite direction from
those intended. Low-impact units varied substantially in
the extent to which they established robust local data
collection systems and how far the data were regarded as
credible by clinicians locally. On some units, evidence
of high infection rates was dismissed as poor quality
data, and change was thus stymied. On some others,
low infection rates were taken as evidence that no
change was needed—but the data were not always
collected accurately enough to justify such a conclusion.
This meant that sometimes very hierarchical cultures
that were not fully supportive of patient safety were
reinforced, and that opportunities for improvements in
practice went unrecognized.
Local histories
Local histories of efforts to control CVC-BSIs were deeply
implicated in the differing responses to the program. In
the Transformed unit, previous attempts to improve
practice had been largely ineffectual. The program was
seen by staff locally has having provided the tools and
techniques they needed to make change, where nothing
had seemed to work before:
[Consultant says] ‘Matching Michigan has genuinely
made a real difference here … We’ve seen some really
quite big changes around here … you can see real
actual evidence of improvement in patient outcomes.’
(Fieldnotes)
On the five Boosted units, the program was absorbed
as part of a local narrative of cumulative improvement.
Staff on these units described having already recognized,
long beforeMatching Michigan, that central line infections
were a problem that they needed to tackle. These units
had made significant gains before Matching Michigan, but
recognized that there was still some room for further
improvement. On these units, local leaders were keen to
drive improvement, but had sometimes experiencedbarriers or resistance to change. These individuals explained
how the program helped them consolidate their gains or
make new improvements. Having a national, centrally led
program was helpful because it enabled them to ask
for resources, demonstrate that proposed changes were
evidence based, persuade reluctant colleagues that
conformity with good practice was now compulsory, and
learn how their infection rates compared with other units:
‘We already had things like a lines trolley in place
and I think that worked reasonably well. Perhaps
wasn’t always stocked as well as it should be.... Being
involved in Matching Michigan project certainly sort
of tightened up vigilance.… We certainly didn’t have
an insertion checklist, and this certainly wasn’t the
sort of the culture whereby everybody felt that line
infections were pretty much preventable. [The change
was] the continuous measurement system, … actually
doing the checklist and publishing the results that we
were getting back.’ (Consultant, participant 114)
In the Low-Impact units, a few staff were resentful or
hostile to the program, but more commonly they expressed
apathy, exasperation, and bewilderment. On these units,
staff argued that they had already invested heavily in
changing practices to reduce CVC-BSIs in response to
previous policy initiatives, that the prevalence of
CVC-BSIs had already greatly diminished, and that
the program was a largely superfluous data collection
exercise. ICU staff on the Low-Impact units were
often unsure what was new or distinctive about
Matching Michigan, given that the technical practices
were the same as those that had already been adopted
as policy. Many saw it as addressing a problem that
they believed had already been solved:
‘Compared to what we were already doing it seemed
to be that wearing a hat [was the only difference]
basically. We were already going over to packs
anyway.’ (Consultant, participant 110)
Staff reported that they could not understand why
CVC-BSIs in ICUs were being targeted by a dedicated
program, when what they saw as other, more pressing
problems—such as ventilator-acquired pneumonia or CVCs
in non-ICU settings—were being neglected. Some saw
the program as a failure to respect what had already
been achieved by ICUs. Even its title caused resentment:
in one unit, a file about the program was defaced, with
‘Matching Michigan’ scribbled out and ‘Exceeding Michigan’
written in:
‘There is sort of an attitude that, actually, it’s come in
a little too late.’ (Senior nurse, participant 88)
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that these views were held not only by the staff ‘on the
ground,’ but often also by those on the safety team set
up locally to implement the program. These local leads
were not always fully convinced of the need for, or value
of, Matching Michigan.
Leading the program into practice: the importance of
creating local coalition and consensus
Perhaps the single most important influence on program
response by individual units—either in promoting or
resisting change—was the extent of consensus and coalition
among the senior medical and nursing staff on individual
ICUs. The commitment, characteristics, and skills of local
leads were pivotal. Transforming or boosting of efforts
was most likely to occur when those locally charged with
implementation were sincere in their beliefs about the
value of the program, were able to create transdisciplinary
alliances, had local credibility among peers, were prepared
to tolerate debate but exercise firmness, and used multiple
tactics including role modelling, persuasion, sanctioning,
reminders, and constant feedback:
‘Cultural change is the biggest threat, because all of
a sudden it fundamentally means that what you’ve
been doing so far is maybe wrong, or people don’t
value what you’ve done for the last 15 years. People
think ‘oh, there’s the smartarse telling us how we’re
supposed to do things.’ So there were a lot of
discussions and persuasion.’
(Consultant, participant 106)
[Consultant says] ‘I think it’s been successful because
it’s a unifying program, it’s one of the few things that
we’ve done that hasn’t been just a doctor thing, or just
a nurse thing, it’s involved the doctors and the nurses
together.’ (Fieldnotes)
Authoritative and unwavering support from senior
consultants was especially important in enabling nurses
to act as a disciplinary force for junior doctors, who
performed most CVC insertions:
‘So the fact that the lead consultant was passionate
about it helped us to bring about change. [We could]
actually [say to the junior doctors,] ‘You will gown up!
You will put a mask on!’ And that was coming from
[the lead consultant] as much as it was from [the
nurses].’ (ICU Outreach Nurse, participant 111)
In the transformed unit, collecting data for the program
revealed previously unrecognized high rates of CVC-BSIs.
This shocked unit staff into action; a local leadership team
emerged who used the program’s tools and techniques tosecure change, and collecting data over time confirmed
that the interventions were effective in reducing rates to
zero from an initial high rate. Matching Michigan, staff in
this unit reported, was the first that came from and was
owned by the ICU, rather than being imposed from the
outside. Led by a young and determined entrepreneurial
consultant, a team was developed that crossed intra-
professional hierarchies and inter-professional work do-
mains. This individual and his consultant colleagues went
about rebuilding the unit culture according to the program’s
goals. He described how he and his colleagues modelled
Matching Michigan’s preferred practice for the insertion
of CVCs and insisted on compliance from junior doctors.
Both junior and senior medical trainees, as well as nurses
were included in the data collection process. He used the
introduction of the checklist and observation as ways of
flattening unit hierarchies and empowering nurses and
junior medics to act on any breaches of aseptic technique
they observed:
In the very beginning we made sure that it was the
charge nurse, or one of the sisters, who would take
the role of the observer. So [we chose someone who
would] feel more confident, and was actively
encouraged to interrupt if there was something
[wrong with our technique]…[We did this] so that the
juniors could see. And if one of the consultants was
putting the central line in we would make sure that
[a nurse observed] us as well. To make sure that
people see it applies for us exactly as for anybody
else…it’s the same rules apply for everybody. If we
put a line in or [one of the junior medics does], it
doesn’t matter.’ (Consultant)
In the units where Matching Michigan had less impact,
senior consultants were not persuaded that all elements
of the program were grounded in high quality evidence,
saw it as an illegitimate policy or bureaucratic intrusion
into professional work, or deemed it irrelevant to their
concerns and interests. Apparently minor issues—such
as the recommendation to wear hats and masks during
CVC insertion—caused irritation and resistance in
some settings because they were perceived to lack
sound evidence. If local program leads did not successfully
build consensus among senior staff that central line
infections were a problem, and that Matching Michigan
was the right answer to the problem, the program was
inclined to stall:
‘I recall from reading that there wasn’t anything that
made me change my practice. I haven’t seen any
people [using hats and masks] and I certainly
wouldn’t you know ask my juniors to do that.’
(Consultant, participant 87)
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got one [consultant] who’s a real advocate and saying,
‘Yeah this is the best thing since sliced bread!’ And
then you’ve the six others who are like, ‘What a load of
crap, we’re not using it.” (Nurse, participant 91)
Executive involvement that generated enthusiasm,
conferred authority, and allocated resources was helpful to
the implementation of the program in local settings.
Where executive involvement was limited to exhorting
the ICUs to produce ‘the numbers [of infections],’ it
reinforced a view of the program as a mandated, perform-
ance management national audit, and risked undermining
the program’s aims:
‘They were getting e-mails [from the hospital
executive] saying, ‘Why haven’t you submitted your
data? So you go back to just tick boxing.… There’s a
complete lack of interest now in line insertion.’
(Senior nurse, participant 40)
Discussion
Our qualitative study is consistent with the quantitative
evaluation of Matching Michigan [13] in suggesting that
improvements in infection control practice for CVCs
preceded the program and were likely to have continued
to occur thereafter, but could not easily be directly
attributed to the program in many instances. Consistent
application of the evidence-based procedures for con-
trolling infection risk in insertion and care of CVCs were
likely to be the single most important determinant of
rates of CVC-BSIs. There is no serious question about
whether these practices ‘work,’ but our study makes it clear
that there were multiple routes to promoting reliability in
their implementation. English ICUs had a much lower
starting rate of infection than in Keystone, suggesting that
they had already made gains in infection reduction without
the program, and improvements continued to occur in
units in clusters that were waiting to join the program
over its course. Compliance with good practice and low
CVC-BSI rates could therefore be achieved by units
without participating in Matching Michigan. Compliance
with procedural good practice and low infection rates
could also be achieved by units in the program without
implementing—or only partially implementing—the
program’s non-technical interventions. The phenotype
of compliance with good practice could therefore arise
in different ways, of which full and authentic engagement
in the program was only one. That improved compliance
could occur through many different routes or ‘genotypes’
may help to explain the finding that Matching Michigan
did not exceed the secular trend; most ICUs had begun
incrementally improving their practices before the program
began, and continued to do so thereafter, sometimesintroducing innovations not part of the program. Our
analysis suggests that whatever explains the declines in
central line infections observed over the course of
Matching Michigan, it was not the set of mechanisms
that were theorized [10] to have explained the effects
seen in Keystone original.
The program bore a strong resemblance to the original,
but primarily at the level of components rather than
hypothesized mechanisms [10]. There was little sense that
Matching Michigan built the social movement thought to
have characterised Keystone, not least because there was
so little contact between participants over the course of
the program. Absence of ongoing contact also suppressed
the possibility for the remaking of professional norms;
participants believed that whatever they were doing locally
was standard. The delivery vehicle mattered hugely. Key-
stone may have been able to engage emotional commit-
ment and create a sense of a community-based enterprise
by mobilizing the star qualities of its leaders, by building on
the bonds people felt with their local hospital association,
and by partnering with a highly prestigious out-of-state
university with a track record of achievement in the area
of patient safety [11]. ICU staff in England did not feel the
same affection, identification with, and sense of ownership
for a program led by a government agency across four
cohorts, notwithstanding the clinical leadership provided
by a senior ICU physician and nurse. Given that profes-
sionals prefer to take their directions for performance
from inside rather than outside the clinical community
[21], this was not a trivial problem. These features may
help to explain the possible decline effect between the
original Keystone program and the attempt to replicate it
in England. They suggest that program fidelity needs to be
assessed holistically, with a focus on mechanisms of
change as well as program components [10].
The challenges of program design and delivery were
intensified by the contexts into which Matching Michigan
was introduced. Staff ’s experience of previous centrally-led
programs as harsh and performance-oriented contributed
to alienation among some. Collecting data on infection
rates often did not always produce a norm-disrupting effect
that challenged units to change their practices and cultures;
instead, in some units, it reinforced the status quo.
Features of ICUs’ internal context also appeared relevant
to explaining how they responded to the program. In units
where change—either transformative or boosting—was
attributed by staff to Matching Michigan, several things
needed to happen. At least one senior physician needed to
exert strong leadership, and to work in coalition with
senior nurses. These leaders needed to be recognized by
their peers as committed, credible, and engaging, and to
communicate a sincere belief in the program. They
needed to do enough listening to ensure peers felt
heard, but also know when to ‘push it hard.’ Data
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command credibility. Leaders also needed to be canny
enough to appropriate the centrally-led, external nature
of the program to confer authority and legitimacy on
their efforts and to drive through improvements that
would otherwise have been difficult to achieve.
The broader context in which Matching Michigan was
launched was highly influential in modifying its possibilities
for effecting change, and further helps in explaining the
possible decline effect. The Keystone project had the
benefit of newness and freshness; ICUs in England, on the
other hand, had been exposed to a long series of initiatives
and pressures in relation to infection control, and believed
that they had already made changes in response.
The possibility that staff in English ICUs would, as
was theorized to have occurred in Keystone, come to
recognize CVC-BSIs as a social problem capable of
being solved [10] was undermined by their perception
that it was a problem that had already been solved.
Matching Michigan was seen by some staff as a failure
to respect what they had already achieved, and, given
the other challenges facing hospitals, a misdirection of
resources. The goals, interests and priorities of the program
were therefore widely seen as misaligned with those of staff
at the sharp-end. Further, it may well have been the case
that in some units there genuinely was very little headroom
for improvement: all the gains that could be made had
already been made, and in such contexts improvement
programs characteristically struggle to demonstrate further
change [14,22].
Importantly, our study does not challenge the efficacy
of the Matching Michigan interventions (data collection,
non-technical and technical) in improving compliance
with evidence-based practices and reducing infection
rates. Much depended on context: program interventions
were able to deliver positive change where they were
implemented. As the ‘transformed’ unit showed, under the
right conditions and deployed appropriately, these inter-
ventions could be used to bring about substantial im-
provements. The disappointment of the program is that it
did not achieve these effects on a larger scale; some ICUs
that could have benefited from strengthening their
organizational culture and consistency of good practice
did not take advantage of the opportunity to do so. We
propose that though the interventions ‘work,’ Matching
Michigan did not fully work as program because of
features of program design and delivery and contexts of
implementation.
None of this is to deny that improvement in rates of
CVC-BSIs did occur while Matching Michigan was
running. Almost two-thirds of units across the pro-
gram reported no infections, meaning a median of
zero—the same as seen in Keystone. A 60% decline in
infection rates over the course of the program is non-trivial, even if it is difficult to pin the credit on the
program.
Only one other study appears to have concurrently
studied CVC-BSIs acquired outside the ICU, and this
too identified a strong secular trend [23] suggesting that
‘rising tides’ could have contributed to the apparent
success of other studies in this area. Our study offers
some insights into the causes of the rising tide and why
it was hard to detect a program effect in excess of the
secular trends. Matching Michigan came into being
because there was already strong policy and professional
pressure—not least because of the success of Keystone—
to do better in reducing rates CVC-BSIs. A recently
published analysis of 20 years of data shows that CVC-
BSI rates began to plummet from 1990 onward, and the
increasing rarity of the infections is likely to have
undermined the view that they were the price of doing
business in ICUs [24,25]. The forces that brought the
program into being continued to intensify over the
course of the program. All ICUs in England were all part
of an institutional ecology exposed to the same environ-
mental pressures that caused them, over time, to become
increasingly sensitized to expectations of good practice.
Each initiative, program, and statement of professional
and scientific consensus is likely to have played a cumu-
lative and mutually reinforcing role, though none that
could easily be discerned individually. A similar effect is
often seen in community health promotion programs
[26]. The main function of programs such as Matching
Michigan in a context where there is an overall trend in
a particular direction may be to add to the pressures and
provide structures and legitimacy for change. Had the
relevance of the context been more fully acknowledged,
and the program more faithful to the hypothesized
mechanisms of the original, more might have been
achieved.
Our study has a number of important limitations. Our
ethnographic visits to units were not longitudinal, but
rather snapshots in time; changes in response to the
program could have occurred after our visits. We did
not conduct a systematic audit of culture and practices,
and thus some inaccuracies in our assessments may be
present. We did not evaluate possible modifiers of effect
of factors such as size of unit, number of consultants
and nurses, and other environmental features. We had
access to ICUs’ reported infection rates only if they
provided them directly to us; for information governance
reasons, these rates could not be verified. It is possible
that we have offered too pessimistic an interpretation of
whether Matching Michigan ‘worked’: the quantitative
evaluation [13] may have underestimated the effects of
the program (or over-estimated the secular trend), since
the ‘waiting’ clusters were not true controls that were
unexposed to the interventions. It is also possible that
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may be flawed in the direction of optimism: it is possible
that it did not function in the way theorized. There is no
way of verifying its mechanisms, because contemporan-
eous ethnographic data were not collected, and the study
design lacked controls.
Conclusions
Our study points to the need for clear understanding of
the mechanisms by which improvement programs work.
Though Matching Michigan reproduced many of the
components of the original Keystone project, it did not
reproduce many of the features of Keystone that were
theorized to have enabled it to work. This, together with
the contexts in which it was introduced, helps to explain
both the decline effect and the apparent failure to
outperform the secular trend. Our analysis will inform
future research in this area [27] by demonstrating the
importance of distinguishing technical interventions
from implementation strategies, and the need for careful
attention to the contexts in which improvement programs
are introduced if they are to deliver maximum benefit for
patients.
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